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ABSTRACT

Responding to the need to investigate heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment (SOA) to target
leverage in a manner that reflects the fractional nature of leverage, we estimate SOA across subsamples of UK firms using the Dynamic Panel Fractional (DPF) estimator. Using firm characteristics
to identify firms subject to varying costs of deviation from and adjustment to target leverage, we
find significant evidence of heterogeneity in the speeds at which UK firms adjust to target
leverage. Our results show that small, high growth and low dividend paying firms adjust to
target leverage faster than their large, low growth and high dividend paying counterparts. We
also find some evidence to suggest openly held firms adjust faster than closely held firms, though
our results are not robust to the categorizing criterion employed or target leverage specification.

I. Introduction

Since Modigliani and Miller (1958) postulated
their capital structure irrelevancy theorem, a number of theories have been formulated to explain
observed financing behaviour. Principal among
the theories that have emerged are the trade-off
theory (Robichek and Myers 1966), pecking order
theory (Myers 1984) and market timing theory
(Baker and Wurgler 2002). Extensive research
has been undertaken to investigate the relative
explanatory power of these theories, with a wide
range of empirical methods and econometric
models employed to test their predictions. One
approach that is commonly adopted in the extant
literature is to test for leverage targeting behaviour
(Flannary and Rangan 2006). The trade-off theory
predicts that firms that deviate from their target
leverage actively adjust to target leverage by issuing, repurchasing or retiring debt and equity
instruments. On the other hand, the pecking
order and market timing theories imply firms’
leverage ratios are merely the historical result of
financing decisions motivated by the minimization of adverse selection costs and the timing of
capital markets, respectively. Thus, any evidence
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that firms actively adjust to a target leverage ratio
would provide support for the trade-off theory
over the other two theories. The results of studies
that adopt this approach are almost unanimous—
firms actively adjust to a target leverage ratio, but
are hindered in doing so by adjustment costs
(Ozkan 2001; De Miguel and Pindado 2001;
Fama and French 2002; Gaud et al. 2005; Leary
and Roberts 2005; Flannery and Rangan 2006).
Such evidence provides strong support for a
dynamic version of the trade-off theory where
firms adjust towards a target leverage ratio, with
the time taken to reach the target, more commonly referred to as the speed of adjustment
(SOA), being dependent on the relative costs of
deviation from, and adjustment to, target leverage.
However, in the last decade a general consensus
has been reached that deviation and adjustment
costs are not homogenous across firms or through
time. The aim is no longer to determine whether
or not the average firm adjusts to a target leverage
ratio or to estimate the average SOA, but rather to
identify the factors that result in different SOAs
due to varying deviation and adjustment costs.
This shift in approach has revealed interesting
insights into leverage targeting behaviour,

College of Business, School of Accounting and Finance, Dublin Institute of Technology, Dublin,
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showing that SOA is likely conditional on financial status (Byoun 2008; Faulkender et al. 2012;
Zhou et al. 2016), macroeconomic conditions
(Cook and Tang 2010), firm characteristics
(Dang, Kim, and Shin 2012; Liao, Mukherjee,
and Wang 2015) and institutional settings
(Oztekin and Flannery 2012). However, despite
this new evidence, it is likely that the true nature
of leverage targeting behaviour is yet to be
revealed. Recent research indicates that commonly
employed econometric methods generate biased
estimates of SOA, as they do not account for the
fractional nature of leverage (Chang and Dasgupta
2009; Elsas and Florysiak 2015; Dang, Kim, and
Shin 2015). Thus, whilst it appears that SOA is
conditional on a number of factors, the exact
nature of this conditionality remains unclear. In
order to address the issue of fractional dependent
variables in a dynamic panel setting, Elsas and
Florysiak (2010) develop the dynamic panel fractional estimator (DPF). The DPF is a doubly censored tobit estimator that facilitates the use of
lagged fractional dependent variables as regressors
in the presence of unobserved fixed effects and an
unbalanced panel, and has been shown to be the
only estimator that can reliably identify different
true SOAs across sub-samples of observations
(Elsas and Florysiak 2015).
Using the DPF estimator, we investigate heterogeneity in the SOA of UK quoted companies.
Focusing on firm characteristics likely to result
in firms facing differing deviation and adjustment
costs, we estimate SOA across sub-samples of
firms based on firm size, growth opportunities,
dividend policy and ownership structure. Our
results strongly indicate that small, high growth
and low dividend paying firms adjust significantly
faster than their large, low growth and high dividend paying counterparts. These results are robust
to the categorizing criterion employed, as well as
the set of variables used to proxy target leverage.
We also find evidence to suggest openly held firms
adjust to target leverage faster than closely held
firms, though our findings vary with categorizing
criterion and target leverage specification.
Our study makes three key contributions to the
capital structure literature. Firstly, although
Drobetz, Schilling, and Schroder (2015) estimate
the SOA of the average UK firm using the DPF

estimator, any evidence relating to heterogeneity
in SOA is based on an initial aggregated sample of
firms in the G7 countries. Thus, to the best of our
knowledge, we are the first study to use the DPF
estimator to investigate heterogeneity in SOA of
UK firms. Secondly, the US and UK are both
market based systems with similar legal and financial traditions, adjustment costs and adjustment
benefits (Drobetz, Schilling, and Schroder 2015),
and hence one would expect the SOAs in these
countries to be affected by firm characteristics in a
similar way. Thus, by examining the effects of firm
size and growth opportunities, characteristics
which Elsas and Florysiak (2011) examine in
their US study, we generate new comparable evidence on the ability of these characteristics to
explain heterogeneity in SOA. Finally, apart from
using firm size and growth opportunities to identify firms subject to varying deviation and adjustment costs, we also categorize firms into subsamples based on dividend policy and ownership
structure. Again to the best of our knowledge, we
are the first study to investigate the effects of these
characteristics on firms’ SOA when using the DPF
estimator, and thus we significantly add to the
growing body of evidence in relation to heterogeneity in SOAs.
The remainder of this paper is structured as
follows: Section II presents the dynamic partial
adjustment model, reviews the extant literature
relating to heterogeneity in SOA and outlines the
key features of the DPF estimator. Section III outlines the salient features of our dataset and discusses the method used to investigate
heterogeneity in SOA. Section IV discusses the
findings of our study and Section V concludes.

II. Dynamic partial adjustment and the extant
literature
The model

Over the last half century, the capital structure
literature has focused on forming theories that
can explain observed variation in firms’ capital
structures, and subsequently assessing the validity
of these theories via econometric tests of their
empirical predictions. One approach that has
come to dominate recent empirical studies is the
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dynamic partial adjustment (DPA) model. This
model assumes that a firm has a unique target
leverage ratio in a given time period, and that it
actively adjusts its leverage ratio each time period
such that the actual leverage ratio is as close as
possible to the target leverage ratio. These
assumptions imply that the change in a firm’s
actual leverage ratio in a given time period can
be expressed as:


(1)
Dit  Dit1 ¼ λ Dit  Di t1
where Dit and Dit are the target and actual leverage ratios of firm i at time t, respectively, Dit 
Dit1 is the change in actual leverage ratio from
time t-1 to time t, Dit  Dit1 is the required
change in the actual leverage ratio from time t-1
to time t to achieve the target leverage ratio, and λ
represents the fraction of the required change in
the actual leverage ratio achieved. In the traditional static trade-off model the firm is assumed
to always be at its optimum leverage ratio, and
thus the change in the leverage ratio in any period
exactly equals the required change, implying λ = 1.
However, if firms face adjustment costs when
seeking to achieve target leverage, the actual
change will be a fraction of the required change,
and λ will lie between 0 and 1. Therefore, λ represents the speed at which a firm adjusts to its
target, and its magnitude is dependent on the
relative costs of deviating from and adjusting to
target leverage. Bringing all Dit1 over to the RHS
and factoring out Dit1 results in:
Dit ¼ ð1  λÞDit1 þ λDit

(2)

Thus, the model to be tested states that the leverage ratio of firm i in time t is a function of a firm’s
leverage ratio in time t-1 and its target leverage
ratio in time t. As a firm’s target leverage is unobservable, the common approach is to model it as a
function of a set of observable lagged firm characteristics, as well as unobservable firm-specific
time-invariant effects. This can be expressed as:
Dit ¼

k
X

βk xkit1 þ αi þ uit

(3)

k¼1

where

k
P
k¼1

βk xkit1 is a set of k firm characteristics

for firm i at time t-1, αi represents unobserved
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firm-specific time-invariant effects, and uit is an
error term. Substituting Equation 3 into Equation
2 and multiplying out results in:
Dit ¼ ð1  λÞDit1 þ λ

k
X

βk xkit1 þ λαi þ λuit

k¼1

(4)

This is the standard version of the DPA model
estimated in the extant literature, where one
minus the coefficient on the lagged dependent
variable implies the speed at which firms on average adjust to target leverage. Examples of early
studies estimating this model include De Miguel
and Pindado (2001), Ozkan (2001), Gaud et al.
(2005) and Flannery and Rangan (2006).

Heterogeneity in SOA

In early studies (De Miguel and Pindado 2001;
Ozkan 2001; Gaud et al. 2005), the purpose of
estimating Equation 4 is to test the core hypothesis of the dynamic trade-off theory that firms
actively adjust to a target leverage ratio. The
approach adopted is to use a single large aggregated sample of firm-year observations, where the
SOA estimated reflects the average speed at which
firms adjust to target leverage. However, given the
growing consensus that the factors motivating
firms’ financing decisions are unlikely to be
homogenous across firms or through time
(Myers 2001; Frank and Goyal 2009), researchers
have begun investigating whether or not SOA is
also heterogeneous due to variations in deviation
and adjustment costs.
One of the earliest studies to investigate heterogeneity in SOA is Drobetz and Wanzenried
(2006), which models λ as a function of the magnitude of deviation from target leverage, firm size,
growth opportunities, and macroeconomic conditions. The study finds SOA to be positively related
to the magnitude of deviation from target leverage, growth opportunities, and macroeconomic
conditions, with firm size having a mixed impact
on SOA. The authors argue that these relationships are due to lower adjustment costs arising
from economies of scale, growing firms having
greater scope to alter the composition of their
financing, and better macroeconomic conditions
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providing easier access to capital markets.
Examining the combined effect of financial status
and deviation from target leverage, Byoun (2008)
argues that firms with large financial surpluses or
deficits are in convenient positions to adjust to
target leverage and hence will exhibit a faster
SOA. However, whether firms are over or under
leveraged should influence the effect financial status has on SOA due to the relative costs of adjusting debt and equity levels. Byoun finds that firms
that are above target leverage adjust faster than
those below target leverage, and that within these
two groups of firms, firms above target leverage
with a surplus adjust faster than those with a
deficit, whilst firms below target leverage with a
deficit adjust faster than those with a surplus.
Focusing on the effect of macroeconomic conditions on SOA, Cook and Tang (2010) find
strong evidence that adjustment speeds vary
through time as access to capital markets changes.
Using a number of variables to distinguish
between good and bad macroeconomic states, the
study finds firms adjust to target leverage faster in
good states than in bad. Furthermore, using bond
ratings as a proxy for financial constraint, it finds
financially constrained firms adjust more slowly
than their unconstrained counterparts. Oztekin
and Flannery (2012) use data from 37 countries
to investigate whether differences in SOA can be
explained by variations in legal, institutional and
financial environments. They find that firms in
common law countries adjust faster than those in
civil law countries due to stronger protection of
investors’ rights, whilst firms in countries with
market-based financial systems, or with more
highly developed financial systems, adjust faster
due to lower transaction costs.
Dang, Kim, and Shin (2012) investigate heterogeneity in SOA using financial status, financing
activities and firm characteristics to proxy for the
deviation and adjustment costs firms face. Firms
with large financing imbalances, large investment
or low earnings volatility are found to adjust faster
than firms with opposing characteristics. Fastest
SOAs are observed in firms that are over-levered
with a financial deficit, deviate from target leverage by a large amount, and adjust through equity
issues rather than debt retirements. Adopting a

similar approach to Byoun (2008), Faulkender
et al. (2012) investigate the joint impact of firms’
cash flows and deviation from target on their
SOA. They argue that adjustment is driven not
only by transactions costs, but also by a firm’s
incentive to access capital markets, where investment opportunities prompt firm’s to seek financing, and excess internal funding provides firms
with the opportunity to repurchase and retire
equity and debt. The results show that firms with
near zero cash flow realizations adjust relatively
slowly, whilst firms with deficits and surpluses in
excess of their deviations from target leverage
adjust two to three times faster.
Taking a different approach to previous studies,
Zhou et al. (2016) argue that SOA is not only
driven by the cash flow benefits and costs associated with achieving target leverage, but also by
the impact on a firm’s cost of capital. The study
focuses on the relationship between a firm’s
implied cost of equity and its deviation from target leverage, and the sensitivity of this relationship
to the scale of the deviation. It finds that deviation
from target leverage is positively related to a firm’s
implied cost of equity, whilst firms whose implied
cost of equity is highly sensitive to the scale of
deviation adjust to target leverage at a faster rate.
Fractional nature of leverage

In order to estimate SOA and investigate heterogeneity in SOA arising from differential deviation
and adjustment costs, most prior studies estimate
Equation 4, or a variation of it, using a variety of
estimators designed to address the econometric
issues associated with estimating the DPA model.
These issues include the presence of unobserved
firm fixed-effects, the inclusion of the lagged
dependent variable as an explanatory variable,
and an unbalanced panel dataset (Drobetz,
Schilling, and Schroder 2015). However, one
issue that until recently has failed to be adequately
addressed is the fractional nature of leverage. By
definition, a firm’s leverage ratio, as measured by
its debt to value ratio, is bounded between 0 and 1.
Chang and Dasgupta (2009) argue that standard
estimators commonly used to measure SOA fail to
take this into account, resulting in SOA estimates
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that may be severely biased. This argument is
supported by Elsas and Florysiak (2015) and
Dang, Kim, and Shin (2015), where the biased
nature of commonly used estimators is demonstrated using both simulated and actual data.
Furthermore, Elsas and Florysiak (2015) show
that standard estimators cannot be used to observe
unique SOAs when different true SOAs exist
across sub-samples of observations, and thus are
unsuitable for investigating heterogeneity in SOA.
To enable lagged fractional dependent variables
be used as regressors in a dynamic panel setting,
Elsas and Florysiak (2010) develop the Dynamic
Panel Fractional estimator (DPF). The DPF is a
doubly censored tobit estimator which uses a
latent variable approach to address the issue of
fractional dependent variables, and specifies a
conditional distribution for the unobserved firmfixed effects to allow for unbalanced panels. The
observable doubly censored dependent variable,
say a firm’s leverage ratio in time t, is given by:
8
#
< 0 if Dit  0;
(5)
D# if 0 < D#
it < 1;
: it
#
1 if Dit  1:
where D#
it is the unobserved latent variable. Elsas
and Florysiak (2015) suggest that in relation to a
firm’s leverage ratio, this latent variable can be
interpreted as a firm’s debt capacity, where debt
capacity can exceed 100% when highly profitable
firms have not fully exploited the tax deductibility
of interest payments, and can be negative if firms
face high agency costs and information asymmetry.
Using both simulated and actual data, Elsas and
Florysiak (2015) demonstrate that the DPF estimator is robust to the bias associated with other estimators, and is capable of identifying different true
SOAs across sub-samples of observations.
SOA heterogeneity and the DPF estimator

Since Elsas and Florysiak (2010) developed the DPF
estimator, studies have begun using it to investigate
heterogeneity in SOA. Using US data, Elsas and
Florysiak (2011) compare SOA across sub-samples
of firms that differ in terms of general firm characteristics, financial status and default risk. They find
1

We do not winsorize our R&D dummy variable as it is a binary variable.
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that small and high growth firms adjust faster than
their counterparts, and similar to prior studies, that
the magnitude of the deviation from target leverage
is positively related to SOA. In a study of the G7
countries, Drobetz, Schilling, and Schroder (2015)
examine the role of macroeconomic conditions on
firms’ SOA. Their results indicate that variations in
adjustment costs due to changing macroeconomic
conditions and differing financial systems result in
firms adjusting to target leverage at varying speeds.
Specifically, firms in market-based economies are
found to adjust faster than those in bank-based
countries, whilst adjustment is slowest in recessionary periods. Finally, Ashan and Qureshi (2017)
investigate the impact of financial liberalization on
the SOA of Pakistani firms, and find significantly
faster adjustment to target long-term debt-to-asset
ratios post financial liberalization.
It is within this strand of the capital structure
literature that out study is situated, and we specifically aim to extend the work of Elsas and Florysiak
(2011) and Drobetz, Schilling, and Schroder (2015)
in two ways. First, by analysing the impact of firm
size and growth opportunities on the SOA of UK
firms when using the DPF estimator, we look to
build on the evidence generated by Drobetz,
Schilling, and Schroder (2015) in relation to the
average SOA of UK firms, whilst also supplementing the findings of Elsas and Florysiak (2011).
Secondly, by using dividend policy and ownership
structure as determinants of adjustment and deviation costs, we seek to provide new evidence in
relation to firms’ adjustment processes.

III. Data, variables and heterogeneity
Data

Our sample is sourced from DataStream, and is
comprised of UK listed firms for which relevant
data is available between 01/01/1996 and 31/12/
2015. Following almost all studies on capital structure, financial institutions and utilities are
excluded, and to minimize the effect of outliers,
variables are winsorized at the 1% level at both
ends of their distributions.1 Observations with
values for total assets less than £1,000,000 are
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dropped to prevent very small firms overly influencing our results, whilst firms must have a minimum of two consecutive observations due to the
use of the lagged dependent variable as a regressor. As the DPF estimator requires an initial leverage value to be identifiable, we require all
observations within firms to be consecutive. For
each firm we keep the longest run of consecutive
observations and drop all other observations.
Finally, we drop observations with missing data
for any of our variables. The final dataset is an
unbalanced panel of 15,669 firm-year observations
across 2111 firms.
Variables

Leverage is measured as the ratio of a firm’s bookvalue total debt to book-value total assets. We use
book-value rather than market-value of total assets
as the denominator in the leverage ratio for two
reasons. First, Beattie, Goodacre, and Thompson
(2006) find that 83% of UK finance directors who
measure financial leverage do so using bookvalues, suggesting leverage targeting behaviour in
UK firms should be investigated using a bookvalue based measure of leverage. Secondly, market-value based measures of leverage are affected
by equity market shocks over which firms have
little or no control, potentially leading to spurious
inferences in relation to SOA. Furthermore,
Huang and Ritter (2009) suggest that if firms’
market-value leverage ratios increase due to a
stock market shock, and stock prices either subsequently recover and firms remain in the sample,
or do not and firms drop out due to financial
distress or takeover, the estimated SOA may be

artificially inflated. Indeed, a number of existing
studies estimate SOAs using both book-value and
market-value leverage ratios, and whilst some studies find little difference between the SOAs estimated using the two leverage measures
(Faulkender et al. 2012; Oztekin and Flannery
2012; Dang, Kim, and Shin 2015; Elsas and
Florysiak 2015), others find notably faster adjustment speeds when leverage is measured in market
terms (Gaud et al. 2005; Huang and Ritter 2009;
Drobetz, Schilling, and Schroder 2015).
In relation to measuring target leverage, we
employ 8 explanatory variables which collectively
proxy for a firm’s target debt-to-value ratio.
Similar to Flannery and Rangan (2006), these variables are; firm size, asset tangibility, profitability,
growth opportunities, research and development,
a dummy variable indicating whether or not
research and development costs are reported in
the income statement, non-debt tax-shields and
annual industry median leverage. Table 1 provides
definitions of the dependent and explanatory variables employed, and Table 2 presents descriptive
statistics for all variables.
Heterogeneity in SOAs

As discussed previously, a number of factors have
been used in the extant literature to categorize
observations into sub-samples across which SOA
is likely to differ due to varying deviation and
adjustment costs. Following Elsas and Florysiak
(2011), we explore heterogeneity in the SOA of
UK firms using four firm characteristics as categorizing variables. Our choice of firm characteristics is based on the fact that each one potentially

Table 1. Variable definitions.
Variable
Leverage
Firm Size
Asset Tangibility
Profitability
Growth Opportunities
Research and Development
R&D Dummy

Abbreviated
Name
lev
size
tang
roa
mtb
rnd
rnddum

Non-Debt Tax-Shields
Industry Median Leverage

ndts
indlev

Definition
The ratio of total debt to total assets.
The natural log of total assets.
The ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets.
The ratio of EBIT to total assets.
The ratio of market value ordinary shares + total debt + book value preference shares to total assets.
The ratio of research and development expenditure to total assets.
A dummy variable that takes a value of 0 when a firm reports research and development expenditure
and 1 otherwise.
The ratio of depreciation, depletion and amortization to total assets.
The industry median leverage in a given year. Industry is defined using DataStream datatype INDUSTRY
GROUP.

This table lists and defines the dependent variable and the variables used to proxy a firm’s target leverage.
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
Minimum Maximum Median
lev
size
tang
roa
mtb
rnd
rnddum
ndts
indlev

0
14.15
0.0003
−1.5011
0.2314
0
0
0.0001
0

0.8517
22.88
0.9317
0.3683
11.34
0.4711
1
0.2336
0.4362

Mean

0.1213 0.1669
17.46
17.63
0.1530 0.2413
0.0523 −0.0280
1.0647 1.6387
0
0.0292
1
0.6826
0.0369 0.0457
0.1526 0.1490

Standard Deviation
0.1795
1.896
0.2443
0.2831
1.7611
0.0787
0.4655
0.0399
0.0905

Statistics are calculated having winsorized all variables, except rnddum, at
the 1% level at both ends of their distributions. Statistics are based on
the full sample of 15,669 firm-year observations.

proxies for either the deviation or adjustment
costs firms incur, and thus if heterogeneity in
SOA is present, categorizing firms based on these
characteristics should make it observable. Similar
to Elsas and Florysiak (2011), we do not formulate
testable hypotheses with regards the exact nature
of the heterogeneity revealed by these characteristics, but rather we identify the net effect they have
on firms’ SOA via the variation in net deviation
and adjustment costs they reveal. The four firm
characteristics we use as categorizing variables and
the justifications for their use are as follows:
Firm size: Due to more diversified operations
and fewer information asymmetry problems, larger firms are expected to have greater access to
capital markets (Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal
2008). Furthermore, if security issuance costs
involve a fixed cost component, larger firms
should benefit from economies of scale when
adjusting to target leverage (Drobetz and
Wanzenried 2006). Thus, one would expect larger
firms to adjust to target leverage at a faster rate.
However, given that smaller firms are at greater
risk of financial distress and are more opaque,
they potentially face higher costs of deviating
from target leverage and may exhibit faster SOA
(Elsas and Florysiak 2011).
Growth opportunities: High transaction costs
prevent firms from quickly adjusting to target
leverage. However, if high growth firms are raising
external finance to fund positive NPV projects, the
transaction costs may be of second order importance, and firms can more freely choose the composition of the financing to achieve target leverage
(Drobetz and Wanzenried 2006). On the other
2
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hand, low growth firms tend to rely more on
internal financing that is limited by the funds
available, and thus are more constrained in their
ability to reach target leverage (Dang, Kim, and
Shin 2012). These arguments suggest high growth
firms will adjust faster than low growth firms. The
impact of growth opportunities is likely more
complex though, as Dang, Kim, and Shin (2012)
note that low growth firms tend to maintain
higher leverage ratios to avoid the free cash flow
problem, face lower transaction costs when raising
external financing due to lower information asymmetry, and face potentially high financial distress
costs due to their high leverage ratios. Each of
these tendencies suggests low growth firms will
exhibit faster SOA than high growth firms.
Dividend policy: The degree to which a firm is
financially constrained is commonly used to investigate heterogeneity in SOA (Cook and Tang 2010;
Faulkender et al. 2012; Drobetz, Schilling, and
Schroder 2015), where unconstrained firms are
expected to adjust at a faster rate. Faulkender
et al. (2012) suggest that a firm’s dividend policy
can proxy for degree of financial constraint, as
dividend paying firms are thought to have better
access to capital markets; if they did not, they would
fund investment via dividend cuts. On the other
hand, dividend payers may be reluctant to cut dividends to finance investment opportunities, as
higher dividends help to reduce agency costs of
equity (Jensen, Solberg, and Zorn 1992) and a cut
in dividends may send a negative signal to investors
(Lintner 1956). Thus, the costs arising from a cut in
dividends may outweigh the potential benefits from
achieving target leverage, suggesting firms with
high pay-out ratios adjust to target leverage more
slowly. We measure dividend policy as the ratio of
common dividends paid to total assets.2
Ownership structure: To investigate the impact
of ownership structure on adjustment to target
leverage, we categorize firms as closely or openly
held using the percentage of shares held by insiders. Similar to our other categorizing variables,
the degree of insider ownership may affect SOA in
a number of ways. Liao, Mukherjee, and Wang
(2015) argue that managerial entrenchment leads

We use total assets as the denominator rather than net income, as zero and negative values of net income would significantly reduce the number of usable
observations.
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firms to operate with lower leverage ratios than
shareholders would desire, as insiders seek to protect themselves from outside pressures. This suggests closely held firms adjust more slowly than
openly held firms. Conversely, if closely held firms
face significant deviation costs, insiders may
choose to adjust to target leverage quite quickly,
as the portion of deviation costs they bear may
exceed any private benefits they get from the
increased control and lower personal risk associated with low, sub-optimal leverage ratios.
When categorizing observations into sub-samples, we adopt a similar approach to that of Elsas
and Florysiak (2011). First, within each time period, we find the median value of the categorizing
variable, and assign each observation a value of 1
or 2 depending on whether an observation’s value
for the categorizing variable is below or above the
within-period median value, respectively. Second,
we calculate the average time-series median-based
sub-sample which each firm belongs to and round
this to the nearest whole number.3 The end result
is that each firm, rather than each observation, is
categorized as either 1 or 2, with 1 representing
firms with ‘low’ values for the categorizing variable and 2 representing firms with ‘high’ values for
the categorizing variable. This sub-sampling
method preserves the consecutive nature of our
within-firm observations and ensures there is
always an identifiable initial leverage value.

IV. Empirical results
Full sample

Table 3 presents the results of the dynamic partial
adjustment model when the full sample of firmyear observations is employed. The results are
generated by estimating Equation 4 using the
DPF estimator. We also include year dummies to
capture the impact of unobserved time-specific
firm-invariant effects on firms’ target leverage
ratios, though for the sake of brevity we only
present the results of a Wald test of the joint
significance of these year dummies.
3

Table 3. Results based on full sample.
Variable

Coefficient

Standard Error

l.lev
l.size
l.tang
l.roa
l.mtb
l.rnd
l.rnddum
l.ndts
l.indlev
N obs
N firms
Wald χ2
Wald χ2 yrs

0.7123***
0.0157***
0.0173
0.0126**
−0.0019**
0.0693**
0.0033
0.1005**
−0.0800***

0.0102
0.0019
0.0124
0.0058
0.0009
0.0293
0.0053
0.0435
0.0212
13,558
2111
12,335***
141***

This table presents the results of the DPF estimator using the full sample of
15,669 firm-year observations. The number of usable observations falls to
13,558 due to the use of lagged explanatory variables. Wald χ2 represents
a test of the joint significance of all explanatory variables included in the
model. Wald χ2 yrs represents a test of the joint significance of all year
dummies only. ***, ** and * denote significance levels of p ≤ 0.01,
p ≤ 0.05 and p ≤ 0.1, respectively.

The statistically significant coefficient on the
lagged leverage ratio implies UK firms exhibit leverage targeting behaviour, and adjust to target leverage
at an average annual rate of 28.8%. This is relatively
close to the average UK SOA of 32% estimated by
Drobetz, Schilling, and Schroder (2015), and is in a
similar range to the average US SOA of 26% as
estimated by both Elsas and Florysiak (2011) and
Drobetz, Schilling, and Schroder (2015). In relation
to the determinants of target leverage, all variables
except asset tangibility and the R&D dummy are
significant at the 5% level or higher. Consistent
with prior studies, size is found to be positively
related to target leverage, as larger firms are less
risky (Scott and Martin 1975), whilst growth opportunities is found to be negatively related to target
leverage, where high growth firms maintain debt
capacity for future investment needs (Myers 1984).
Interestingly, the profitability and research and
development coefficients are both positive.
These results suggest more profitable firms
employ more debt financing as they wish to maximize the value of the debt tax-shield (Modigliani
and Miller 1963), whilst firms engaged in significant
R&D activities may prefer debt over external equity
as they are more subject to information asymmetry.
Unusual results are observed for non-debt taxshields and industry median leverage. Trade-off theory predicts non-debt tax-shields will be negatively

For example, if a firm’s value for the categorizing variable is below the within-period median value in 1996, 1997 and 1998, the firm is assigned a value of 1
in each of these years. If its value for the categorizing variable is above the within-period median value in 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003, the firm is
assigned a value of 2 in each of these years. The time-series average of the values assigned to the firm is 1.625, and this is then rounded up to 2. Thus, all
observations for the firm are categorized into the ‘high’ sub-sample.
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related to leverage, as firms with alternative methods
of shielding tax stand to benefit less from debt financing (DeAngelo and Masulis 1980), whilst one
would intuitively expect a firm’s leverage ratio to
be positively related to industry median leverage. It
may be that our non-debt tax-shields variable is
actually proxying asset tangibility, a phenomenon
Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984) refer to as the
‘debt securibility’ effect, which makes it difficult to
isolate the non-debt tax-shield effect associated with
depreciation of fixed assets. Our finding for median
industry leverage may be due to the determinants of
target leverage being lagged relative to the dependent variable. That is, whilst a firm’s leverage ratio in
time t is likely positively related to industry median
leverage in time t, its actual (and target) leverage
ratio in time t + 1 may be negatively related to the
industry median leverage in time t. For example, if a
firm’s desire to distinguish itself as low financial risk
relative to industry competitors is a significant determinant of a firm’s target leverage, one would expect
a negative relationship between firm leverage in time
t + 1 and industry median leverage in time t. Indeed,
when we re-estimate Equation 4 with industry median leverage measured contemporaneously with firm
leverage, the coefficient changes from significantly
negative to significantly positive.4
Sub-samples

Table 4 presents results relating to heterogeneity
in SOA. Again we estimate Equation 4 with year
dummies using the DPF estimator, but do so
separately for each sub-sample of firms. For the
sake of brevity we only present coefficient and
standard error estimates for the lagged leverage
variable and implied SOAs. We also report the
absolute difference in SOAs within sub-sample
sets, and a two-tailed z-test statistic that indicates
the extent to which SOAs can be considered significantly different across ‘low’ and ‘high’ subsamples.5 All lagged leverage coefficients are significant at the 0.1% level.
In relation to the effect of firm size on SOA, the
average SOAs for small and large firms are 29.8%
4
5
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and 24.2% respectively, and the difference in SOAs
across the sub-samples is significant at the 1%
level. This suggests that although small firms
may face higher adjustment costs than large
firms due to limited access to capital markets or
the fixed cost nature of transaction costs, the significant deviation costs small firms face due to
potential financial distress costs and information
asymmetry result in them exhibiting faster SOA.
This finding is consistent with that of Elsas and
Florysiak (2011) who find a negative relationship
between firm size and SOA in US firms.
With regards to SOA heterogeneity resulting
from varying growth opportunities, we find high
growth firms adjust to target leverage at a rate of
30.1% per annum, whilst low growth firms adjust
at a much lower rate of 23.4% per annum. Again,
the difference in SOAs across the sub-samples is
significant at the 1% level, providing strong evidence that SOA is conditional on a firm’s growth
opportunities. Our findings suggest that raising
finance for investment opportunities likely provides a convenient time to adjust to target leverage, as transaction costs are less important in the
decision making process. On the other hand, firms
with fewer investment opportunities place greater
emphasis on the magnitude of adjustment costs, as
leverage adjustment is potentially the sole motivation for issuing securities. Again our results are
consistent with Elsas and Florysiak (2011), where
a positive relationship between SOA and growth
opportunities is observed.
In terms of the impact dividend policy has on
leverage targeting behaviour, we find evidence to
suggest that firms that pay out zero or low dividends
adjust to target leverage significantly faster than high
dividend paying firms. We observe SOAs of 29.1%
and 23.9% in the low and high dividend paying subsamples, respectively, with the difference in SOAs
across the sub-samples significant at the 5% level.
These findings are likely due to the freedom that
zero or low dividend paying firms have to pursue
target leverage. High dividend payers may be reluctant to lower dividend pay-out due to the role dividends play in mitigating agency costs of equity, and

The results of our re-estimated model are available upon request.
β1 β2
, where β1 and β2 are the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable within each sub-sample
The z test statistic is calculated as follows: z ¼ pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2
2
seβ1 þseβ2

pairing, and seβ1 and seβ2 are the associated standard errors.
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Table 4. Sub-sample results.
Categorizing Variable

N obs

Sub-Sample

Coeff

SE

SOA

Abs Diff z-test

Firm Size

6,300
7,258
6,611
6,947
6,002
7,556
6,939
6,619

Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High

0.7018
0.7579
0.7660
0.6987
0.7088
0.7609
0.6970
0.7320

0.0161
0.0138
0.0155
0.0143
0.0160
0.0136
0.0137
0.0154

0.2982
0.2421
0.2340
0.3013
0.2912
0.2391
0.3030
0.2680

0.0561***
2.646
0.0673***
3.191
0.0521**
2.481
0.0350*
1.698

Growth Opportunities
Dividend Policy
Insider Ownership

This table presents the results of the DPF estimator using sub-samples of firm-year observations. N obs represents the number of usable firm-year
observations in a given sub-sample. Sub-sample indicates whether firms are classified as having low or high values of the categorizing variables. Coeff and
SE represent the coefficient estimate and standard error, respectively, of the lagged dependent variable in a given sub-sample, and SOA is the implied
speed of adjustment associated with each coefficient estimate. For each sub-sample set, Abs-Diff is the absolute difference between the implied SOAs of
the Low and High sub-samples, and z-test (in italics) is a test statistic indicating whether or not this difference is statistically significant. ***, ** and *
denote significance levels of p ≤ 0.01, p ≤ 0.05 and p ≤ 0.1, respectively.

the adverse signal a cut in dividends might send to
financial markets. Hence any benefit from adjusting
to target leverage using funds diverted from dividends may not be sufficient to warrant adjustment.
On the other hand, the benefits of adjusting to target
leverage can be fully enjoyed by low dividend payers,
as there are no off-setting agency costs of equity or
signalling issues resulting from dividend cuts to be
considered.
Our results pertaining to ownership structure
show SOAs are affected by the degree to which a
firm’s shares are closely held, though the effect is
marginal. We observe a SOA of 30.3% in openly held
firms as compared to a SOA of 26.8% in closely held
firms, with the difference in SOAs being significant
at only the 10% level. Our results suggest closely held
firms adjust to target leverage relatively slowly as a
result of pursuing leverage policies that reduce insiders’ personal risks rather than maximize shareholder value. In other words, the costs of deviating
from target leverage, which insiders would be partially subject to, is lower than the ‘adjustment costs’
of operating with a leverage ratio that does not
maximize insiders’ personal welfare.
Robustness tests

To test the robustness of our results, we repeat our
analyses using two variations of our methodology.
First, our method for assigning firms to sub-samples is based on the median values of our categorizing variables. To investigate whether or not this
cut-off point for low and high values of the
6

categorizing variables is driving our results, or
preventing us from observing more statistically
significant differences across sub-samples, we
rerun our tests using the 40th and 60th percentiles
as lower and upper cut-off points, respectively.
Second, the reliability of SOA as generated using
the standard partial adjustment model is dependent on the precision with which a firm’s target
leverage ratio is proxied. To determine whether or
not our results are driven by our choice of variables proxying for target leverage, we re-estimate
SOAs using an alternative set of target leverage
determinants. These are variables that have been
used in the extant literature to either proxy for
target leverage or investigate the determinants of
capital structure in general, and are defined in
Table 5.6 We also test whether the results based
on this alternative target leverage specification are
dependent on the use of the median value of our
categorizing variables in generating sub-samples
by again using the 40th and 60th percentiles as
upper and lower cut-off points.
The results of these robustness tests are presented in Table 6. With regards to the effects of
firm size, growth opportunities, and dividend policy on SOA, varying the cut-off points chosen to
categorize firms into sub-samples and/or the variables used to proxy target leverage does not qualitatively change our findings. In each variation to
our methodology we again observe significantly
faster SOAs in small, high growth and low dividend paying firms. On the other hand, our results
relating to ownership structure are clearly

Due to data limitations relating to some of the additional variables we construct, the number of firm-year observations before accounting for the reduction
due to lagged explanatory variables decreases to 14,959.
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Table 5. Alternative target leverage specification.
Variable

Definition

Firm Size
The natural log of sales.
Capital Expenditure
The ratio of capital expenditure to total assets.
Profitability
The ratio of EBIT to sales.
Asset Intangibility
The ratio of intangible assets to total assets.
Liquidity
The ratio of current assets to current liabilities.
Effective Tax Rate
The ratio of income taxes to EBIT. In the case where EBIT is 0 or negative, the ratio is recorded as 0.
Altman’s Z-Score Modified by Mackie-Mason (1990) (3.3EBIT + sales + 1.4retained earnings + 1.2working capital) divided by total assets.
Industry Median Leverage
The industry median leverage in a given year. Industry is defined using DataStream datatype
INDUSTRY GROUP.
This table lists and defines the variables used as alternative proxies for a firm’s target leverage.

Table 6. Robustness tests.
Methodological Specification
Original Target Leverage Proxy Variables
40th and 60th Percentiles as Cut-Off Points

Categorizing Variable
Firm Size
Growth Opportunities
Dividend Policy
Insider Ownership

Alternative Target Leverage Proxy Variables
Median as Cut-Off Point

Firm Size
Growth Opportunities
Dividend Policy
Insider Ownership

Alternative Target Leverage Proxy Variables
40th and 60th Percentiles as Cut-Off Points

Firm Size
Growth Opportunities
Dividend Policy
Insider Ownership

N obs
5124
5295
4647
4709
5760
5137
5220
4948
6072
6885
6378
6579
5566
7391
6651
6306
4824
5071
4468
4467
5235
4896
4974
4741

Sub-Sample
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High

SOA
0.2898
0.2346
0.2161
0.2935
0.2834
0.2153
0.3200
0.2619
0.2760
0.2195
0.1988
0.2900
0.2682
0.1944
0.2685
0.2568
0.2875
0.2233
0.1975
0.2898
0.2627
0.1778
0.2961
0.2585

Abs Diff z-test
0.0552**
2.281
0.0774***
3.028
0.0681***
2.982
0.0581**
2.406
0.0565**
2.562
0.0912***
4.052
0.0738***
3.243
0.0117
0.538
0.0642**
2.518
0.0923***
3.423
0.0849***
3.354
0.0376
1.475

This table presents the results of the DPF estimator using sub-samples of firm-year observations having varied the cut-off points used to categorize firms into
sub-samples and/or the set of target leverage proxy variables. Methodological specification indicates the variation(s) applied to the original methodology.
N obs represents the number of usable firm-year observations in a given sub-sample. Sub-sample indicates whether firms are classified as having low or
high values of the categorizing variables. SOA is the implied speed of adjustment for each sub-sample. For each sub-sample set, Abs-Diff is the absolute
difference between the implied SOAs of the Low and High sub-samples, and z-test (in italics) is a test statistic indicating whether or not this difference is
statistically significant. ***, ** and * denote significance levels of p ≤ 0.01, p ≤ 0.05 and p ≤ 0.1, respectively. To save space, lagged dependent variable
coefficient estimates and standard errors are not reported.

dependent on the cut-off point chosen and the
target leverage specification, as differences in
SOAs across openly and closely held firms vary
from being significant at the 5% level to being
statistically insignificant.
V. Conclusion

This study investigates heterogeneity in the speed
of adjustment (SOA) to target leverage in UK
firms. Using the Dynamic Panel Fractional
(DPF) estimator which accounts for the fractional
nature of leverage, we find that a firm’s SOA to
target leverage is dependent on firm size, growth
opportunities, and dividend policy. Our results

suggest that smaller firms adjust faster than larger
firms due to higher costs of deviation resulting
from increased risk of financial distress and/or
higher degree of opacity. With regards to growth
opportunities, we find a significantly faster SOA in
high growth firms, which is likely due to the
second order importance of transaction costs
when such firms issue financing. A faster SOA is
also observed when comparing zero or low dividend paying firms to high dividend paying firms,
as a policy of paying little or no dividends likely
enables firms to place greater emphasis on achieving target leverage rather than maintaining dividend pay-out. Finally, we find some evidence that
closely held firms adjust to target leverage slower
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than their openly held counterparts, as achieving
target leverage may not fit with the personal interests of insiders. Our findings relating to firm size,
growth opportunities and dividend policy are
robust to the cut-off point chosen for identifying
firms with low and high values of the categorizing
variables, as well as to an alternative target leverage specification, but our results relating to ownership structure are not.
The findings of our study have important implications for both researchers and decision makers.
The robust results relating to the impact of firm
size, growth opportunities and dividend policy as
generated using an estimator that is unbiased in
the presence of a fractional dependent variable,
and the similarities of some of our results to
those of Elsas and Florysiak (2011), provide strong
support for the continued investigation of heterogeneity in SOA using the DPF estimator. Indeed,
in a similar manner to the analysis of Pakistani
firms’ SOA pre and post financial liberalization as
carried out by Ashan and Qureshi (2017), an
interesting future experiment may be to assess
the impact of ‘Brexit’ on the SOA of UK firms
using the DPF estimator. With regards to decision
makers, our results relating to dividend policy
suggest that this endogenously determined firm
characteristic may hinder a firm’s ability to
achieve target leverage, and thus should be considered in this light when firms first set there stalls
out as low or high dividend payers.
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